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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Were the Appellant's Constitutional rights 
violated when he was sentenced to the maximum term of incar-
ceration without receiving credit for pre-trial incarceration? 
2. Are individuals entitled to credit for pre-
conviction incarceration against any sentence? 
iv 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
-v-
DANNY RICHARDS, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20580 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against Danny P.ichards 
for assault, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-102 (1953 as amended). Mr. Richards pled guilty 
to the charge on February 28, 1985 in the Third District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay 
E. Banks, Judge, presiding. Mr. Richards was sentenced by the 
same court to the maximum term of six months incarceration 
without receiving credit for the period of pre-conviction 
incarceration which he had served. 
Statement of Facts 
On December 15, 1984 Mr. Richards was arrested for 
Aggravated Assault, a felony (R.21). He was incarcerated in 
the Salt Lake County jail, unable to Dost bail, and remained 
there throughout the preceedings against him (R. 4,5,41,56). 
He was, at the time of his arrest, an indigent person who 
owned no property other than his clothes and had no employment 
or any source of income. In view of this financial status 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Mr. Richards was assigned court appointed counsel. He had 
several bond hearings but was never able to post the bail 
that was set (R. 4,5,12,13,23,28,35,41,56,64). 
On February 28, 1985, while still in custody, Mr. 
Richards pled guilty to assault, a Class B Misdemeanor and 
a lesser and included offense of the original charge against 
him (T. 17, R. 36,37). On March 8, 1985 he was sentenced to 
serve six months in the County Jail and to make restitution. 
(T. 20-21, R. 51). Six months is the maximum time allowed 
by law for a Class B Misdemeanor , §76-3-204, Utah Code 
Annotated. The Court: gave him nine days credit for time 
served, from the day he entered his plea of guilty, despite 
his request for credit for the time served since his initial 
incarceration, an additional seventy-five (75) days. (T.21) 
On April 5, 1985, Mr. Richards filed a Notice of Appeal . On 
April 8, 1985 he filed in the Third District Court a Motion 
to Correct an Illegal Sentence pursuant to §77-35-22 (e) or 
in the alternative a Petition for a Certificate of Probable 
Cause pursuant to §77-35-27, Utah Code Annotated, (R.56,57). 
This motion was heard by Judge Banks on April 12, 1985 and 
denied (R.67. A) . 
On April 25, 1985, Mr. Richards through counsel, filed 
an Application for a Certificate of Probable Cause and a Motion 
to stay any sentence in excess of six months with this Court. 
That motion was heard and granted by this Court on May 6, 1985. 
Mr. Richards was released from jail on June 15, 1935, six 
months after his initial arrest and incarceration. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Appellant, Danny Richards, first contends 
that his sentence, which was for the maximum statutory 
term, was an illegal sentence. The sentence was illegal 
because of the failure of the trial court to give credit 
for the significant period of pre-trial incarceration which 
the Appellant had served. The effect of such a sentence 
was to create a new maximum sentence for the offense which 
was longer than the maximum term provided by statute. Such 
a sentence denied the Appellant equal protection of the laws 
by establishing two different maximum terms of incarceration -
one term for those eligible for pre-trial release (through 
either bail or Mown recognizance" release) and another term 
for those unable to secure such a release. The effect was 
to discriminate against Mr. Richards because of his indigent 
status. Further, the sentence was illegal because it 
violated Constitutional prohibitions against dual punishment 
for the same offense. 
The Appellant further contends that any sentence 
which fails to apply credit for a term of pre-trial 
incarceration is an illegal sentence. This contention 
is also based on equal protection rationale and the 
Constitutional prohibition against double punishment. 
-3-
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ARGUMENTS 
POINT I
 : 
MR RICHARDS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
WERE VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS SENTENCED 
TO THE "MAXIMUM TERM OF INCARCERATION 
WITHOUT RECEIVING CREDIT FOR PRE-TRIAL 
INCARCERATION. ' . ,,.., . ,., ..,, 
The Appellant contends that the trial court's sentence, 
which failed to consider or credit the period of pre-conviction 
incarceration, is an illegal sentence. The sentence, as given 
by the trial court, will result in Mr. Richards' serving 75 
days longer than the statutory maximum term for a Class B 
misdemeanor, (See Addendum A). Consequently, the sentence 
denies Mr. Richards1 equal Drotection of the laws and violates 
Constitutional prohibitions against dual punishment. This 
contention is predicated on the United States Supreme Court's 
holdings in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 
26 L.Ed.2d. 586 (1970), and Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S. 
Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d. 130 (1971). These cases hold that Equal 
Protection considerations prohibit a state from subjecting 
certain classes of individuals to terms of incarceration longer 
than the statutory maximum. The Court determined that Equal 
Protection was denied when such extended confinement resulted 
from the inability to meet the pecuniary provisions of a 
sentence. In Williams, the defendant was convicted of petty 
theft. He subsequently received the statutory maximum sentence 
of one year imprisonment, a $500.00 fine and $5.00 in court 
costs. The defendant petitioned the sentencing judge to vacate 
-4-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that portion of the order requiring that he remain in prison 
after expiration of the one year term. Defendant did not 
have the money to pay the fine and court costs. Under Illinois 
law, he would have remained in prison and "worked off" his 
$505.00 deficit at a rate of $5.00 a day. Under this scheme, 
the defendant would have been imprisoned 101 days longer than 
the statutory term for his offense. The sentencing judge 
denied the petition to vacate and the Supreme Court of Illinois 
affirmed. The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment 
on Equal Protection grounds and stated that: "Once the State 
has defined the outer limits of incarceration...it may not 
then subject a class of convicted defendants to a period of 
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely by reason of 
their indigency." Williams, 26 L.Ed.2d at 59 3. 
In Tate, decided one year later, the Petitioner had been 
convicted of a traffic violation punishable by fines only. 
The accumulative fine was $425.00* Petitioner, because he was 
an indigent, could not pay the fines. Pursuant to a Texas 
statute, the trial court had ordered him imprisoned for 85 
days. While in prison, the petitioner was to "work off" the 
fine at a rate of $5.00 a day. The County Criminal Court 
denied his petition for habeas corpus. The Texas Court of 
Criminal appeals affirmed, rejecting Petitioner's claim that 
his imprisonment was unconstitutional. The United States 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Relying on the Williams 
Equal Protection rationale the Court in Tate held that "the 
-5-
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any 
substantive offense be the same for all defendants irrespective 
of their economic status." Tate, 28 L.Ed.2d. at 133 (quoting 
Williams v. Illinois, 26 L.Ed. 2d. 586 ,594 (1970)). 
Following the equal protection rationale of the 
Williams and Tate decisions, both state and federal courts have 
examined what has been termed the "logical extensions" of those 
holdings. A majority of these courts have taken the position 
that once a defendant is sentenced to the statutory maximum 
term, he or she is entitled to credit for ANY pre-trial 
incarceration that resulted from the financial inability to 
post bail. The equal protection argument common to this 
position is perhaps best illustrated in the case of Reanier 
v. Smith, 517 P.2d. 949 (Wash. 1974). In this consolidated 
decision, two of the four cases summarily decided by the court 
•* dealt with fact situations identical to those at issue here. 
The first was Rinehart v. Smith, 517 P. 2d. 949 (Wash. 1974). 
In that case the defendant was taken into custody on December 8, 
1969 and charged with second degree burglary. Due to his 
indigency, he was unable to post bail. Consequently, he remained 
in jail until March 31, 1970, when he was sentenced to the 
statutory maximum term of fifteen years. He did not receive 
credit for the four and one-half months he spent in jail prior to 
trial. The second case was Woods v. Smith, 517 P.2d 949 (Wash. 
1974). In that case the defendant was arrested on October 1, 
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1969 and placed in jail pursuant to a narcotics charge. 
He too was unable to post bail and remained incarcerated. 
On March 23, 1970 he was convicted and sentenced to the 
maximum term of twenty years and the mandatory minimum 
term of five years. He did not receive credit for the five 
and half months of pre-trial detention he served. In holding 
that Equal Protection mandates that indigent defendants be 
granted credit for such pre-trial incarceration, the Supreme 
Court of Washington reasoned that: 
Otherwise, such a person!s total time 
in custody would exceed that of a 
defendant likewise sentenced but who 
had been able to obtain pre-trial 
release. Thus, two sets of maximum 
and mandatory minimum terms would be 
erected, one for those unable to procure 
pre-trail release from confinement and 
another for those fortunate enough to 
obtain such release. 
Id. at 951. 
A federal decision with a similar holding is 
Hook v. Arizona, 496 F.2d.1172 (9th Cir. 1974). The facts 
of Hook again parallel those in the present case. In that 
case, the appellant was arrested for forgery with a credit 
card. Because he could not post bail, he remained incarcerated 
until 236 days later, he was convicted and received the 
statutory maximum sentence of ten years. He filed a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus requesting that he be granted credit on his 
sentence for his pre-sentence confinement. The Ninth Circuit 
Court upheld his writ and held that the defendant was entitled 
to credit for his pre-trial incarceration. The Ninth Circuit 
-7-
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followed the Williams rationale and came to the conclusion 
that: 
Time a defendent SDends in jail before 
sentence because he is unable to raise 
bond must be credited if he is later 
sentenced to a maximum term. 
[T]he inability of an indigent criminal 
defendant to make bond should not 
result in extending the duration of his 
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum. 
496 F.2d 1174 (Quoting 449 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 
1971)). 
Applying these cases to the present case leads to 
the conclusion that Mr. Richards is entitled to receive 
credit for his 75 days of pre-trial incarceration. Failure 
to grant Mr. Richards credit results in a denial of equal 
protection. Mr. Richards would be forced to serve a longer 
sentence than would a richer defendant similarly situated 
who had been able to raise bail for pre-trial release. 
For other state and federal decisions following 
this reasoning see:Jackson v. Alabama, 536 F.2d. 113 (5th 
Cir. 1976); Culp v. Bounds, 325 F.SUDD 416 (D.C.N.C. 1971); 
Hill v. Wainwright, 465 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1972); Hart v. 
Henderson, 449 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. 
Games, 499 F.2d 143 (2nd Cir. 1971); Godbold v. Wilson, 
518 F.Supp 1265 (D.C. Colo. 1981); Brown v. Beto, 359 F.Supp. 
118 (D.C. Tex 1973); Monsour v. Gray, 375 F.Supp. 786 (D.C. Wis. 
1973); In Re Young, 107 Cal Rptr 915 (1973); State v. Sutton, 
518 P.2d. 590, 521 P.2d 1008 (Ariz. 1974); State v. Cook, 679 
P.2d, 413 (Wash. App. 1984); Anglin v. State, 525 P.2d 34 
(Nev. 1975). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Utah Supreme Court considered this issue in the 
case of State v. Winning, 531 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1975). The facts 
of the Winning case parallel those of Mr. Richard's. In that 
case, the defendant was arrested on June 11, 1974 pursuant to 
a charge of automobile theft, a second degree felony. Because 
defendant was unable to secure bail, he remained in jail until 
August 30, 1974. At that time he pled guilty to a Class A 
misdemeanor and was sentenced to the statutory maximum term 
of one year. From the time he was first incarcerated until 
the time he was sentenced, the defendant had spent 70 days in 
jail. In its holding, the Utah Supreme Court refused defendant's 
request that he be granted credit for the 70 days. However, in 
reaching this decision, the court did not take into consideration 
the Equal Protection standard of the Williams and Tate line 
of cases. Rather, the court reached its decision bv distinguishing 
the facts of Winning from those of North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed. 2d. 656 (1969). The 
refusal to grant credit was based on the Utah Supreme Court's 
view at that time that the Pearce double jeopardy rationale 
was inapplicable to the fact situation of Winning. In Pearce 
the respondent had been convicted of assault with intent to 
commit rape. He was sentenced to a term of 12-15 years. While 
serving the sentence, petitioner appealed his conviction. 
As a result, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed 
his conviction. He was subsequently re-tried, convicted and 
sentenced to a term of eight years. The eight years, when 
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added to the time petitioner already served, "amounted to a 
longer total sentence then that originally imposed". Pearce 
23 L.Ed.2d at 65 7. The United States Supreme Court stated 
that the Fifth Amendment prohibition against multiple 
punishments "requires that punishment already exacted must be 
fully 'credited1 in imposing sentence upon a new conviction 
for the same offense" Pearce, 23 L.Ed.2d at 657. The Utah 
Supreme Court, in holding the Pearce double jeopardy rationale 
inapplicable, stated "In the case before us, the Defendant 
was awaiting trial and disposition of his case rather than 
undergoing punishment" Winning, 531 P.2d at 1303. In other woi 
the Utah Supreme Court based its decision on the view 
that pre-trial incarceration is not punishment. This position 
is against the clear weight of authority. For this reason, the 
Utah Supreme Court's holding in Winning should be overturned. 
Several federal courts, as well as state courts, have 
refused to distinguish between pre-trial detention and post-
conviction punishment. One such case is the District Court of 
North Carolina's decision in Culp v. Bounds, 325 F.SUDP. 416 
(D.C.N.C. 1971). In Culp, the defendant, like Mr. Richards, 
was incarcerated for a period prior to trial and later given 
the statutory maximum sentence. The District Court applied 
.the Pearce rationale and held that: ,.;. 
Culp shall be given credit for time 
spent in custody prior to commitment 
r • where he has been given a maximum 
sentence. Pre-trial detention is nothing 
less than punishment. An unaccused who 
is not allowed or can not raise bail is 
-10-
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f^ deprived of his liberty. His 
incarceration is indistinguishable 
in effect from that of one... who is ^. 
retried after obtaining post conviction 
relief. In both instances, the power 
of the State has been utilized to punish... 
Id. at 419 (emphasis added). 
See, also Wright v Maryland Pennitentiary, 429 F.2d 
1101 (4th Cir. 1970); Wilson v. North Carolina, 438 F.2d 284 
(4th Cir. 1971); Reanier v. Smith, 517 P.2d 949 (Wash 1974). 
These cases uniformly hold that pre-sentence incarceration 
constitutes punishment for fifth amendment purposes. 
The fifth amendment rationale employed by the United 
States Supreme Court in Pearce is as follows: "The 
Constitutional guarantee against multiple punishments for 
the same offense absolutely requires that punishment exacted 
must be fully 'credited1 in imposing sentence upon a new 
conviction for the same offense."23 L.Ed.2d at 665. 
Since pre-trial incarceration is equivalent to nunishment 
under the fifth amendment, failure to grant credit for such 
incarceration is a violation of Constitutional guarantees 
against dual punishment. Thus, failure to grant Mr. Richards 
credit for his seventy-five days of pre-trial incarceration 
is a violation of the prohibition against dual punishment 
as well as a denial of equal protection. See Reanier v. Smith, 
517 P.2d 949 (1974); Culp v. Bounds, 325 F.Supp 416 (D.C.N.C. 
1971); State v. Phelan, 617 P.2d 1212 (Wash 1983). All three 
of these cases follow the extension of the Pearce fifth 
amendment rationale which includes credit for pre-trial 
incarceration. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In addition to the case law, other authority supports 
the Appellant's position. For example, Model Penal Code 
§7.09 (1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) in essence states 
that when an individual is incarcerated nrior to trial, and 
subsequently sentenced to the statutory maximum he is entitled 
to full credit for his pre-trial incarceration. (Addendum B) 
Another provision following this rationale is the American 
Bar Association's Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives 
and Procedures, Standard 18-4.7 (Approved Draft 1968; 1982 Supp). 
This section provides that credit should be awarded as against 
the imposition of the statutory maximum term for any incarceration 
that results from a criminal charge. The American Bar 
Association said that such credit should specifically include 
time spent in custody prior to trial. (Addendum C) In addition 
18 U.S.C. §3585 contains similar language. (Addendum D). That 
provision states that a defendant must be given credit for 
any term of incarceration that is a result of the offense of 
which he is convicted. 
In the present case, Mr. Richards, because of his 
financial inability to post bail, would be forced to spend 
75 days in jail beyond the statutory maximum of six months 
for a Class B misdemeanor. Failure to grant Mr. Richards 
credit for such incarceration will violate Constitutional 
standards in two ways.. First, it denies Mr. Richards equal 
-12-
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protection of the laws. Second, it violates constitutional 
prohibitions against dual punishment. In light of the case 
law and other provisions discussed above, Mr, Pvichards is 
entitled to receive credit for his pre-trial incarceration. 
POINT II 
INDIVIDUALS ARE ENTITLED TO CREDIT FOR -
PRE-CONVICTION INCARCERATION ARISING OUT 
OF INABILITY TO POST BAIL AS AGAINST ANY 
SENTENCE IMPOSED. 
As previously stated, the Tate v. Short, supra, 
Williams v. Illinois, supra equal protection rationale 
has been extended by numerous courts. These courts have 
uniformly held that where a defendant is sentenced to the 
maximum term proscribed by statute, he is entitled to credit 
for pre-sentence incarceration. Several courts have taken 
the Williams and Tate rationale one step further and have 
held that Equal Protection requires that pre-trial incarceration, 
resulting from the inability to post bail, must be credited 
as against ANY post conviction sentence regardless of whether 
or not the sum of sentence and pre-trial incarceration is 
beyond the statutory maximum. Two such recent cases are 
State v. Phelan, 671 P.2d. 1212 (Wash. 1983) and Godbold v. 
Wilson, 513 F.Supp. 1265 (D.C. Colo-1981). The equal 
protection basis for this position is probably best illustrated 
by the District Court of Colorado in the Godbold decision. 
In this case, the petitioner was arrested on June 29, 1979. 
He was unable to post bail and remained incarcerated until his 
trial. On October 11, 1979, petitioner was found guilty of 
attempted felony theft which carried a maximum sentence of 
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of five years and third degree assault which carried a 
maximum sentence of two years. On December 20, 1979, ; 
petitioner was sentenced to two to four years for the first 
offense and twelve months for the second. The trial judge 
refused to grant petitioner credit for the 174 days of pre-
sentence incarceration. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed 
and held that there was no constitutional right to credit. 
See Godbold v. District Court, 623 p.2d 862 (Colo. 1981). 
The Federal District Court of Colorado held that petitioner 
was entitled to credit for his 174 days of pre-sentence 
confinement. The District Court followed the rationale 
propounded by Colorado Supreme Court Justice Quinn in his dissent in 
Godbold v. District Court, sunra. The District Court found 
that cases such as this may differ from Williams, supra 
and Tate^ supra in that Mthe defendant is not be be confined 
longer than the statutory maximum." 518 F. Supn at 1269. 
But the court followed the equal protection rationale and 
recognized that f![t]he consequences to the defendant are the 
same however: the indigent is forced to serve a longer term 
in prison than the non-indigent solely because of his poverty11. 
Id. 518 F. Supp. at 1269 (Quoting 623 P.2d at 866). Under this 
broadened extension of Williams and Tate, it is clear that 
Mr. Richards would be entitled to credit for his 75 days of 
pre-trial incarceration as against any term of imprisonment. 
In addition, four of the five federal circuit courts 
which have had occasion to decide the issue have followed the 
broadened extension of Williams and Tate, indicating a clear 
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majority and trend in favor of this position. See 
Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1977); 
King v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 321, 325 (8th Cir. 1975); Ham v. 
North Carolina, 471 F.2d.406,408 (4th Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Gaines, 494 F.2d, 143 (2nd Cir. 1971). Only one 
circuit court which has ruled on this issue has held that 
there is no constitutional right to credit. See Mathews v. 
Dees, 579 F.2d 929, 931 (5th Cir. 1978). 
Failure to credit any sentence x^ ith pre-trial 
incarceration has been held to violate Constitutional 
prohibitions against dual punishments as well. A recent, 
and well reasoned decision so holding is the Supreme Court 
of Washington's decision in State v. Phelan, 671 P.2d. 1212 
(Wash. 1983). In Phelan, the defendant was arrested and 
convicted of second degree rape. Prior to his conviction, 
defendant spent fourteen months in jail. Mr. Phelan was 
originally given credit against his maximum term for the 
fourteen months plus four months of "good time". However, 
on the State's motion for reconsideration, the Court deleted 
the good time credit. Defendant than sought an order from 
the Supreme Court of Washington that he be given credit for 
his jail time against his discretionary minimum term as well. 
After exhaustive analysis of North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, 
Justice Utter, writing for the majority, extended the Pearce 
rationale into this area. In doing .so, he came to the conclusion 
that M[pjrior incarceration not only must be credited against 
a maximum sentence, but must be credited on ANY sentence 
imposed." 671 P.2d at 1216 (emphasis added). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The court then went on to quote the following passage 
from Pearce, as the basis for its holding: 
The constitutional violation is flagrantly 
apparent in a case involving the imposition 
of a maximum sentence after reconviction... 
though not so dramatically evident, the same 
principle obviously holds true whenever 
punishment already endured is not fully 
L subtracted from any new sentence imposed. 
Id. at 1216, quoting 23 L.Ed.2d at 665. The Washington Supreme 
Court had already held nine years earlier in Reanier, supra, that pre 
trial incarceration was in fact punishment. In light of this 
position, the court held that the above quoted language 
"mandates credit not only against maximum and mandatory 
minimum terms but against discretionary minimum terms as well." 
671 P.2d at 1216 (emphasis added) The effect of this holding is 
that pre-trial incarceration must be credited against any sentence 
imposed. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant asks this court to find that it was 
a violation of his constitutional rights to sentence him to 
the maximum term of incarceration without giving him credit 
for pre-trial detention when he was unable to post bail. 
Further the appellant asked this court to find that it was 
a violation of his constitutional rights to deny him credit 
for his pre-trial detention whether he was sentenced to the 
maximum term for the crime for which he was convicted or not. 
The appellant asks this Court to remand this case to the 
Third District Court and direct the Third District Court to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
correct its illegal sentence and to give Mr. Richards credit 
for the seventy-five days he served on this case before his 
conviction. 
f4— 
Respectfully submitted this day of November, 
1985 
KAREN JENNINGS QT~ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction—Term of imprisonment.—A person 
who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to imprison-
ment as follows: 
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding 
one year; 
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding 
six months; 
(3) In the case of a claas C misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding 
ninety days. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-204, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1973, ch. 196, §76-3-204. Criminal Law©=1208(l). 
24B C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1986. 
21 Am. Jur. 2d 551, Criminal Law § 590. 
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§ 7.08 SENTENCING AUTHORITY OF COURT ^ j 
provision of federal law that permits a commitment for evaluation 
of up to six months,17 and the extension of the period to ont year 
should not disturb this apparent acceptance.18 On grounds of 
policy, there is no substantial reason why a defendant should bo 
protected against a possible reconsideration and increase of s son* 
tence that has proven erroneous, especially in view of tht ft* 
quirement that the error be brought to light within a year. Tim 
minimal unfairness that might be thought to inhere in tht post* 
ponement of certainty for one year is more than offset by tht 
gains to the system of correcting a serious mistake in tht rait 
case when the power will be used. If the court exercises Its 
power to resentence the offender, full credit is awarded for actual 
time served under the prior sentence, as well as credit for any 
good time earned. 
5. Finality of Original Sentence. Subsection (6) establishes 
that the offender's original sentence is final for all purposes other 
than resentencing, i.e., the taking of appeal, or instituting a col* 
lateral attack on conviction. Subsection (7) further provides that 
all remedies provided by law for correcting an illegal sentence 
are preserved. 
Section 7.09. Credit for Time of Detention Prior to Sentence; Credit 
for Imprisonment Under Earlier Sentence for Same 
Crime.* 
(1) When a defendant who is sentenced to imprisonment has 
previously been detained in any state or local correctional or other 
institution following his [conviction of] [arrest for] the crime for 
case concerned the entirely different problem of resentencing following rtConvlcUfla> 
the procedural aspects of Section 7.08 clearly meet the due process concern* expritMa 
by Justice Stewart. Cf. Low, Special Offender Sentencing, 8 Am.Crim.L.Q. 7JJ»*" 
94 (1970), for discussion of some of the constitutional issues raised on the • n m l ^ * 
question of whether the prosecutor should be entitled to appeal a sentence for the PJ"T**J 
of seeking an increase. See also Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1971); UlUUtf 
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980). 
17
 See note 2 supra. 
18
 The Model Code's approach is also supported by those of the m o r e * " ^ 4 ^ 
habitual offender laws that have permitted resentence at any time on proof of w» 
requisite prior convictions. Relevant statutes are collected in Spencer Ve,Tef1,l^||A 
U.S. 554, 586-87 n.ll (1967) (dissenting opinion). See also the d * ^ ^ . ? ? ? 
Standards, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 5.5 Commentary H * ^ v i * £ 
proved Draft 1968); 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 18-6.5 Commenury m 
18-470 to -472 (2d ed. 1980). 
* History. Presented to the Institute in Proposed Final Draft No. 1 ind *W**T' 
at the May 1961 meeting. See ALI Proceedings 345 (1961). ^ * * t e d **f" W SJJ 
Institute in the Proposed Official Draft and approved at the May 1962 meeting. 
ALI Proceedings 226-27 (1962). 
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Art. 7 
Art. 7 CREDIT FOR TIME OF DETENTION § 7 .09 
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which such sentence is imposed, such period of detention following 
his [conviction] [arrest] shall be deducted from the maximum term, 
and from the minimum, if any, of such sentence. The officer 
having custody of the defendant shall furnish a certificate to the 
Court at the time of sentence, showing the length of such detention 
of the defendant prior to sentence in any state or local correctional 
or other institution, and the certificate shall be annexed to the 
official records of the defendant's commitment. 
(2) When a judgment of conviction is vacated and a new sentence 
is thereafter imposed upon the defendant for the same crime, the 
period of detention and imprisonment theretofore served shall be 
deducted from the maximum term, and from the minimum, if any, 
of the new sentence. The officer having custody of the defendant 
shall furnish a certificate to the Court at the time of sentence, 
showing the period of imprisonment served under the original sen-
tence, and the certificate shall be annexed to the official records 
of the defendant's new commitment. 
Explanatory Note 
Subsection (1) establishes the defendant's right to credit against 
his ultimate sentence for time served prior to the imposition of 
the sentence as a result of the same criminal charge. A certif-
icate is required to be furnished to the court and to the correc-
tional officials showing the length of any such detention. 
Subsection (2) covers the case where the defendant's original 
conviction or sentence has been vacated, and where a new trial 
has resulted in a second conviction for an offense based upon the 
same conduct. In such a case the defendant is entitled to credit 
against his new sentence for time served on the previous sentence, 
against both the minimum and the maximum of his new term. 
Again, a certificate procedure is established to assure that the 
credit is awarded. 
Comment1 
1. Presentence Custody. Subsection (1) requires that time 
served as a result of a criminal charge prior to the imposition of 
sentence for a conviction on that charge should be credited against 
the sentence ultimately imposed. The bracketed portions of the 
proposal indicate some flexibility as to the starting point for com-
puting the time to be credited against the ultimate sentence. The 
nd approved 
again to ths 
meting. S« 
+
 With a few exceptions, research ended Oct. 1, 1979. For the key to abbreviated 
citations used for enacted and proposed penal codes throughout footnotes, see p. xxxi 
supra. 
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§ 7.09 SENTENCING AUTHORITY OF COURT Art, 7 
position of the Code's Reporters was that arrest is the proper 
starting point since the bulk of the period of presentence detention 
is likely to occur between arrest and trial, and relatively little 
between conviction and sentence. All of the jurisdictions that 
grant credit commence the period with the arrest.1 The Amer-
ican Bar Association and the National Advisory Commission agree 
that credit for the period from arrest should be given.2 If the 
defendant is committed for a presentence study, Section 7.08(1) 
requires that the period of such commitment also be deducted 
from any imprisonment sentence. 
Subject to the reservation as to whether the point of beginning 
is arrest or conviction, Section 7.09 would assure that time al-
ready served by an offender, although prior to his formal sen-
tencing, will go toward satisfying any sentence of imprisonment 
that is imposed.3 The unfavorable conditions that frequently 
characterize such presentence detention emphasize the justice of 
this requirement.4 The mandatory credit will limit the dispo-
sitional powers of the court in relatively few cases, namely, when 
the court wishes to impose the longest possible minimum or max-
imum term and the time previously served and to be credited will 
result in actual service in the institution of a lesser period.5 The 
limit is plainly called for if the statutory maximum terms are to 
have their proper effect. If five years is the legislatively fixed 
maximum for a given offense, it would be inappropriate for a 
defendant to be required to serve six years as a result of having 
been in custody for one year prior to the imposition of the five 
year maximum. In regard to the minimum, however, it has been 
1
 See Appendix to this Comment. See also Annot., Right to Credit for Time Spent 
in Custody Prior to Conviction, 77 A.L.R.3d 182 (1977). 
2
 ABA Standards, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 3.6(a) (Approved Draft 
1968); 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 18-4.7(a) (2d ed. 1980); National Advisory 
Comm'n on CriminalJustice Standards and Goals, Corrections [hereinafter cited as Nat'l 
Advisory Comm'n], Standard 5.8(1) (1973). 
3
 The following states go beyond this purpose in giving credit as well for any time 
that might elapse between the imposition of the sentence by the court and the actual 
commencement of the imprisonment: Ark., 111., Ky., Minn., Mo., Mont., N.Y., Ohio 
& Ore. For citations, see Appendix to this Comment. 
4
 See W. G. Nagel, The New Red Bam: A Critical Look at the Modem American 
Prison 17-35 (1973); Nat'l Advisory Comm'n, supra note 2, at 3. 
5
 If the denial of credit on the sentence results in a prison term longer than the 
statutory maximum, some courts have held the denial to violate the equal protection 
guarantee, especially if the presentence custody could have been avoided if the defendant 
had had the financial ability to make bail. See, e.g., Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 
1231 (5th Cir. 1976); Taylor v. Gray, 375 F.Supp. 790 (D. Wis. 1974); cf. Mohr v. 
Jordan, 370 F.Supp. 1149 (D. Md. 1974) (credit constitutional^ required without mention 
of bail). 
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HJRT Art. 1 Art. 7 CREDIT FOR TIME OF DETENTION § 7 .09 
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suggested that the credit may operate to undermine the rule that 
it is necessary for a felony sentence to be no less than one year.6 
The rationale of the one year period relates to the minimum time 
needed for correctional programs to have any meaningful impact. 
Permitting credit provisions to result in commitments to state 
correctional facilities for a lesser period may be thought to risk 
undercutting the benefits of these programs. This criticism ap-
pears to be of more theoretical than practical significance. The 
minimum term is, after all, only a minimum, after which time the 
parole board may order release. If the parole board accepts the 
view that correctional programs should last at least a year, it 
need not release offenders who have spent less than a year in the 
programs. New York, in response to this problem, applies the 
credit only against that part of the minimum that exceeds one 
year,7 a modification that is faithful to the sentencing philosophy 
of the Model Code. 
There is an ambiguity in the formulation of Section 7.09(1) that 
warrants clarification. The credit is given for detention for "the 
crime for which such sentence is imposed." Suppose that a per-
son is arrested and detained for rape but convicted and sentenced 
for assault. Obviously if the detention is for the same series of 
acts as the sentence, credit should not depend on their being for 
the same crime in a narrow sense. Thus, "the crime" in this 
subsection should be interpreted to include detention for the same 
conduct that ultimately leads to conviction and sentence. The 
federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 1358 (1976)) more explicitly produces 
this conclusion by applying the credit against sentences imposed 
not only for the "offense" for which the prisoner has been in cus-
tody but also for the "acts" that led to pretrial custody and sen-
tence. Both the American Bar Association and the National Ad-
visory Commission agree with this position, recommending credit 
for time spent in custody if the custody and the sentence are based 
on the same conduct.8 
The second sentence of Subsection (1) requires that the court 
be notified by the officer having custody of the defendant of the 
total period served by the defendant as a result of the charge. 
The court must then take account of the time so served, and may 
impose any sentence, up to the statutory maximum, that is ap-
propriate in light of this and all other relevant sentencing factors. 
6
 See ABA Standards, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 3.6, Commentary 
at 189 (Approved Draft 1968). 
7N.Y. § 70.30(3). 
8
 ABA Standards (Approved Draft 1968), supra note 2; 3 ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice (2d ed. 1980), supra note 2; Nat'l Advisory Comm'n, supra note 2. 
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§ 7.09 SENTENCING AUTHORITY OF COURT Art, 7 
It is important that the formal mechanism outlined in this sec-
tion, by which credit for time served prior to sentencing is awarded, 
be an integral part of every sentencing proceeding. The auto-
matic operation of this mechanism will not only assure the pres-
ervation of statutory limits on sentencing but will also prevent 
any misunderstanding on the part of the defendant or the sen-
tencing court as to the meaning of the sentence imposed. Com-
plete understanding of the maximum and minimum limits of any 
sentence is crucial to both the defendant and the court at the time 
of imposition. 
2. Reconvictions and Resentences. Subsection (2) would 
award credit for time served under a conviction that has been set 
aside and replaced with another conviction. Although drafted 
prior to the decision in North Carolina v. Pearce* the Code 
position is in accord with the constitutional requirements of that 
decision, namely, that "punishment already exacted must be fully 
'credited' in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for the same 
offense."10 
The principle that supports the award of credit for time served 
when the second conviction is for precisely the same offense as 
the first also supports the award of credit when a reconviction is 
for a lesser included crime or for some other crime arising from 
the same conduct. Thus, "the same crime" in Subsection (2) should 
be given the same broad reading as "the crime" in Subsection (1). 
The Model Code's policy on credit would also extend to a situation 
in which a court vacates a sentence and imposes a new one without 
vacating the conviction.11 
9
 395 U.S. 711 (1969). The Pearce case also limits the extent to which a sentence 
longer than the former sentence may be imposed upon an offender who has been re-
convicted. However, this issue is not involved in the provision under discussion. 
10
 Id. at 718-19 (footnote omitted). 
11
 The New York statute, for example, provides for credit in such a situation, N.Y. 
§ 70.30(5). Although the ABA Standards, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 
(Approved Draft 1968 & 2d ed. 1980), and the recommendations of the National Advisory 
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (Corrections (1973)) have liberal 
credit provisions, they make no specific reference to situations in which only the sentence 
is vacated. Other revisions that include credit for confinement under vacated conviction 
or sentence are as follows: Ariz. § 13-709(C); Haw. § 706-671(2); Minn. § 609.145(1) 
(Cum. Supp. 1979); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-402 (1979) (where judgment declared 
invalid or modified); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 973.04 (1971); Md. (p) § 70.30(5); Mass. (p) 
ch. 264, § 14(b) (where conviction vacated or sentence revised or reviewed); Mich. (2d 
p) 1979 Final Draft § 1470(5). 
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Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 18-4.7 
need in two respects. First, it directs an award of credit for all time spent 
serving an out-of-state sentence since the commission of the crime 
unless the sentencing court specifically directed, within the limitations 
of subparagraph (b)(1), that the latest sentence be served consecutively. 
This credit would be awarded under the procedures of standard 18-6.8 
absent a specific direction to the contrary. Second, paragraph (c) pro-
poses that the legislature by statute preclude corrections authorities 
from permitting a detainer to have any effect on the conditions under 
which an offender will serve the sentence or on consideration of the 
offender for parole. Parole to a detainer is a practice already employed 
in many jurisdictions, and while parole to continued custody is indeed 
inconsistent with the purposes of parole and the fitness of the offender 
for such a disposition, it is clear that detention of the offender beyond 
the time that the offender would otherwise serve is substantially less 
appropriate.15 With respect to prison privileges and other conditions of 
serving a sentence, the fact of a detainer — even if filed following in-
dictment in another jurisdiction-—is rarely of any relevance to the 
problems that the prisoner poses. Case law has recently begun to restrict 
the ability of prison authorities to use detainers in the inmate classifica-
tion process,16 and this trend should be legislatively codified.17 
Standard 18-4.7. Credit for pretrial confinement 
(a) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term 
should be given to a defendant for all time spent in custody as a 
result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is im-
posed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based. 
This should specifically include credit for time spent in custody 
prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, pending the resolu-
tion of an appeal, and prior to arrival at the institution to which 
the defendant has been committed. 
(b) Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term 
should be given to a defendant for all time spent in custody under 
15. See generally ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE §305.24 and comment at 129-134 (Tent. Draft 
No. 5, 1956). 
16. Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1973); Kane v. Virginia, 419 F.2d 1369 
(4th Cir. 1970); Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974); Norris v. Georgia, 357 
F. Supp. 1200 (W.D.N.C. 1973); Lawrence v. Blackwell, 298 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ga. 1969). 
17. See ABA, >urra note 8, §3.5(c) (restricting use of detainers in classification decisions). 
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18-4.7 Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 
a prior sentence if the defendant is later reprosecuted and resen-
tenced for the same offense or for another offense based on the 
same conduct. In the case of such a reprosecution, this should 
include credit in accordance with paragraph (a) for all time spent 
in custody as a result of both the original charge and any subse-
quent charge for the same offense or for another offense based on 
the same conduct. 
(c) If a defendant is serving multiple sentences, and if one of 
the sentences is set aside as the result of direct or collateral at-
tack, credit against the maximum term and any minimum term of 
the remaining sentences should be given for all time served since 
the commission of the offenses on which the sentences were 
based. 
(d) If the defendant is arrested on one charge and later prose-
cuted on another charge growing out of conduct which occurred 
prior to arrest, credit against the maximum term and any minimum 
term of any sentence resulting from such prosecution should be 
given for all time spent in custody under the former charge which 
has not been credited against another sentence. 
(e) To avoid ambiguities, the award of credit for pretrial incarcer-
ation should be automatic and mechanical, and affirmative action 
by the sentencing court should be unnecessary. A procedure con-
sistent with this principle is specified in standard 18-6.8. 
(f) The policies of sentencing authorities and those of other 
agencies empowered to determine the date of actual release 
should be carefully coordinated in the area of sentencing credit to 
achieve consistency of application and the abolition of any dis-
tinction between pretrial and posttrial confinement. In particular, 
where the agency administering early release employs guidelines 
to determine the presumptive date of such release, credit for pre-
trial confinement should dso be given against such presumptive 
term. To the extent that full integration of policies respecting 
sentencing credit is not achieved, the sentencing court should 
make corresponding adjustments in the sentence it imposes to 
ensure that the defendant who is confined before trial receives 
full credit therefor. 
(g) These standards do not address the question of whether 
credit should be given against the maximum term for good conduct 
within the correctional institution or for compliance with institu-
tional rules. 
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Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 18-4.7 
History of Standard 
This is original standard 3.6. There are only stylistic changes, except 
that paragraph (f) addresses the new context of parole guidelines and 
requires the sentencing court to ascertain that consideration similar to 
that required here be required of parole authorities, and if it is not, that 
compensating adjustments be made in the sentence imposed. 
Related Standards 
ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice 10-5.12, 18-6.8 
ALI, Model Penal Code §7.09 
NAC, Corrections 5.8 
NCCUSL, Model Sentencing and Corrections Act §3-502 
Commentary 
Background 
Under a variety of circumstances, time spent in custody as a result of 
criminal conduct does not count against the sentence imposed. This may 
occur because no statute exists in the jurisdiction granting a credit for 
such presentence confinement,1 because the statute is narrowly drafted 
and excludes some types of incarceration,2 because the court is pre-
1. A 1974 ABA survey found that forty-one jurisdictions provide at least partial credit 
against the sentence for time spent in jail prior to sentencing; another nine jurisdictions 
made the decision discretionary with the trial judge; one state specifically forbade credit; 
and another had "no law on the matter." See ABA SPECIAL COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL 
FACILITIES AND SERVICES, SENTENCING COMPUTATION LAWS AND PRACTICE 15 (1974). Federal law 
provides a comprehensive credit. See 18 U.S.C. §3568 (1976). 
2. Statutes frequently provide that a sentence "shall commence to run upon arrival at 
the prison" or shall be for a term of years "in the state penitentiary." See State v. Kennedy, 
106 Ariz. 190, 472 P.2d 59 (1970); Ex parte Cofield, 42 Ala. App. 344,164 So. 2d 716 (1964). 
Other statutes can be read not to give a credit for time spent in a mental hospital for 
observation or study prior to sentencing. An ABA survey found only thirty-two statutes 
that expressly awarded credit for such incarceration in a mental hospital. SENTENCING 
COMPUTATION LAWS AND PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 15. For the constitutional arguments that 
such a limited crediting system offends due process and equal protection concepts, see 
Schomhorst, Presentence Confinement and the Constitution: The Burial of Dead Time, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 
1041 (1972); Stacy, Constitutional Right to Sentence Credit for Pre-Trial Incarceration, 41 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 823 (1972); Comment, Prisoners Rights and Equal Protection, 20 AM. U.L. REV. 482 (1970-
1971). See also Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). 
Special complications arise in the multijurisdictional context. One decision has denied 
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18-4.7 Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures 
sumed under local law to have taken such confinement into considera-
tion as long as the sentence imposed plus the period of pretrial confine-
ment did not exceed the maximum authorized sentence,3 or because the 
recognized constitutional case law in the circuit requires a credit for 
pretrial confinement only where the crime is a "bailable" one.4 What-
ever the reason, there is today only partial recognition of the principle 
endorsed here that distinctions between pretrial and posttrial confine-
ment should be irrelevant. 
It is the purpose of this standard to end such technical distinctions by 
granting a comprehensive credit that treats all periods of confinement 
attributable to the underlying criminal transaction as equivalent, no 
matter what label is attached to such incarceration. To this end, para-
graph (a) requires the credit to be offset against both the minimum and 
maximum terms imposed, and paragraph (f) seeks to integrate the poli-
cies of sentencing and parole authorities so that such confinement will 
similarly reduce any presumptive guideline term used by parole au-
thorities. 
There are several reasons for this standard's attempt to standardize 
practices with respect to sentencing credits. First, and most common, is 
that pretrial detention is related to indigency. Thus, to ignore the pre-
trial incarceration of the indigent offender is to permit discrimination 
based on economic status, which, regardless of the extensive debate 
a credit against a federal sentence for time spent in state custody pending a trial under 
a federal detainer issued with respect to the same federal conviction. See Bruss v. Harris, 
479 F.2d 392 (10th Or. 1973). For criticism of this denial, see Note, Bruss p. Harris: No 
Federal Credit for Time Spent in State Custody — The Effect of a Federal Detainer, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 
473. Clearly such time is causally related to the federal conviction, but the court held 
that the credit had been exhausted by applying it against the concurrent state sentence. 
See note 24 infra. In general, federal courts now give a credit for time spent in a state 
prison under a federal detainer. See O'Connor v. Attorney General, 470 F.2d 732 (5th 
Cir. 1972). 
3. Compare Stapf v. United States, 367 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Davis v. Willingham, 
415 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1969); Holt v. United States, 422 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1970); State 
v. Kennedy, 106 Ariz. 190, 472 P.2d 59 (1970); Jenkins v. Warden, 4 Md. App. 629, 244 
A.2d 468 (1968); Miles v. State, 214 So. 2d 101 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1968). More recent 
cases refusing to adopt such a presumption are discussed at note 8 infra. 
4. See, e.g., Cobb v. Bailey, 469 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 
1231 (5th Cir. 1976). Although it can be argued that there is no invidious discrimination 
involved where credit is denied for a nonbailable offense, since the rich and the poor are 
treated alike, commentators have pointed out that the case for "jail time" credits rests on 
other constitutional foundations besides that of equal protection. See Comment, Credit for 
Time Served Between Arrest and Sentencing, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1148 (1973). 
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over its constitutionality, is unwise and unjust. Second, the least drastic 
means principle also has an application in this context. "Jail time" serves 
most recognized penological goals equally well as does prison time, and 
in fact is generally understood to represent a qualitatively harsher form 
of confinement than prison custody. To fail to credit it thus results in 
confinement in excess of the minimum necessary to realize deterrent, 
incapacitative, or retributive purposes. A third argument arises when 
the issue is whether custody under a prior invalid conviction should be 
credited. In principle, the government should have at least a moral 
obligation to recompense the offender for time wrongfully served under 
an invalid conviction, and it can only make restitution by permitting 
such a credit.5 Additionally, to the extent that credit is not awarded 
comprehensively for all forms of custody relating to the criminal charge 
for which the sentence is imposed, an unfortunate opportunity for 
abuse arises. The possibility cannot be wholly ignored that atypical 
forms of presentence confinement (such as detention in a psychiatric 
institution for observation or treatment) might be themselves used as 
a punishment in order "to manipulate time factors in sentencing."6 
Finally, credit not given for confinement awaiting appeal may result in 
a chilling effect on the defendant's right to appeal the conviction.7 
Constitutional Developments 
Since the first edition, the most important developments concerning 
sentence credits involve the constitutional claim that denial of credit for 
jail time violates the equal protection clause. A number of circuit court 
decisions have accepted this argument,8 although some decisions have 
5. A similar position was taken by the National Advisory Commission. See NAC, 
CORRECTIONS, commentary at 171. In most situations such a credit will also be constitution-
ally required by North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
6. L. FARMER, OBSERVATION AND STUDY 4 (1977). See also Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625 (5th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1974). 
7. Statutes denying credit pending appeal are collected in Whalen, Resentence Without 
Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the Laws, 35 MINN. L. REV. 239, 246 n.40 (1951). 
Contemporary statutes do not expressly deny credit for time pending appeal, but by 
delaying the sentence's commencement until the arrival of the prisoner at the state prison, 
they may make possible substantially the same outcome. See SENTENCING COMPUTATION LAWS 
AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 19. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968). 
8. Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1977); Gaines v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006 
(1971) (memorandum), remanding to United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1971); 
Durkin v. Davis, 538 F.2d 1037, 1039-1040 (4th Cir. 1976); Ham v. North Carolina, 471 
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limited this rule to bailable offenses. The rationale for the latter distinc-
tion is that the rich and the poor alike are incarcerated pending trial for 
nonbailable offenses and thus no discrimination results when credit for 
such jail time is denied.9 Neither these standards nor the Pretrial Release 
standards approve of this distinction. In essence, such a distinction 
legitimizes preventive detention based only on the category of the 
offense. Preventive confinement is subject to attack on a variety of other 
constitutional theories,10 and its impact should be minimized by re-
compensing the defendant through a credit against the sentence. Failure 
to do so also creates often unjustified disparities between offenders 
convicted of bailable and nonbailable offenses, since the difference in 
the gravity of the respective offenses committed by these two classes 
may be modest in comparison with the difference in treatment they 
thereby receive. 
An even more significant limitation on the development of a compre-
hensive credit for presentence custody is the rule followed in several 
circuits that, if the actual sentence imposed plus the period of presen-
tence custody did not exceed the statutory maximum, then a presump-
tion arises that the court gave credit for the presentence time.11 Such a 
presumption may occasionally conform with the court's actual intent, 
but it is at least equally possible that the court simply overlooked the 
presentence custody already served or at least failed to give this ques-
tion the serious attention it warrants. In any event, recent decisions have 
refused to accept this line of reasoning and have held that such a 
presumption may not be used to overcome what the courts saw as a 
constitutional right.12 These standards have always agreed with this 
latter position and so provide in standard 18-6.8 for the automatic 
crediting of presentence custody without any inquiry into the court's 
probable intent. 
The position of the Supreme Court on the constitutional status of jail 
time credit is less certain. In McGinnis v. Royster, the Court upheld a New 
F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973); Hart v. Henderson, 449 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971); Wright v. 
Maryland Penitentiary, 429 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1970); Mohr v. Jordan, 370 F. Supp. 1149 
(D. Md. 1974); Culp v. Bounds, 325 F. Supp. 416 (W.D.N.C. 1971); White v. Gilligan, 351 
F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Workman v. Cardwell, 338 F. Supp. 893 (N.D. Ohio 1972). 
9. See note 4 supra. 
10. See Comment, supra note 4. See also commentary to standard 18-3.2. 
11. See cases collected at note 3 supra. 
12. Johnson v. Prast, 548 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1977); Faye v. Gray, 541 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 
1976); Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 983 (1974). 
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York statute that denied good time credit to state prisoners for time 
spent in presentence custody in county jails.13 In so doing, it noted that 
since the good time credit system was designed to reflect a prisoner's 
performance in prison rehabilitation programs, a rational basis existed 
for its denial to presentence custody in county jails that lacked equiva-
lent rehabilitative facilities. 
Distinctions, of course, exist between good time and jail time credits. 
The latter is a far less important right to the offender because the 
offender is generally parole eligible by the point such credits would 
require release, and the majority of offenders are released through the 
parole process rather than by the expiration of the statutory maximum 
less good time credits. In contrast to the issue of jail time that reduces 
the minimum period all offenders must serve, good time generally only 
becomes applicable if, after an individualized assessment by the parole 
agency, the offender has been deemed sufficiently culpable or dangerous 
on his or her own merits to require further confinement. Even in this 
special context of good time credits, subsequent decisions have distin-
guished McGinnis on the grounds that the case turned on the unique 
character of the New York statute with its special emphasis on rehabili-
tation.14 An earlier memorandum decision by the Court at least suggests 
that where credit against the minimum term is at issue the Court will 
be less prepared to accept references to the statutory purposes of 
confinement as a permissible basis on which to treat more harshly those 
unable to make bail.15 The majority of commentators have also seen 
McGinnis as limited in its application and have argued that a constitu-
tional right to credit for presentence custody now exists.16 
Statutory Developments 
Statutory developments since the first edition still show the same 
diversity of approaches with respect to sentencing credits. A 1974 ABA 
13. 410 U.S. 263 (1973). But see Pruett v. Texas, 468 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1972), afid. en banc, 
470 F.2d 1182 (1973). 
14. See, e.g., Berger, Equal Protection and Criminal Sentencing: Legal and Policy Considerations, 71 
Nw. U.L. REV. 29 (1976); Note, Constitutional Law — Sentencing — Withholding Good Time Credit 
from Prisoners Awaiting Appeal, 51 TEX. L. REV. 348 (1973); Note, Sentence Crediting for the State 
Criminal Defendant — A Constitutional Requirement, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 586, 593 n.35 (1973). 
15. Gaines v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006 (1971); for the decision after remand, see 
United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1971). 
16. See sources cited at notes 12 & 14 supra. 
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survey found that forty-one jurisdictions provided at least partial credit 
against the sentence for time spent in jail before sentencing,17 nine made 
the decision discretionary with the trial judge, and only one specifically 
forbade such credit.18 Some thirty-two states also gave explicit credit for 
time spent in a mental hospital, three others did so by administrative 
practice, and six declined to give such credit.19 The computation of the 
credit also varies among jurisdictions. Older statutes still provide that 
the sentence commences "upon arrival at the prison," and by so focus-
ing on time spent at a specific institution they have been narrowly 
interpreted to deny all credits.20 Unfortunately, many jurisdictions that 
do grant credit in some form for jail time fail to specify procedures for 
its determination or award. Thus, it is judicial case law that establishes 
the operative presumption, often in a way that narrows the statutory 
grant.21 
Detention Prior to Service of Sentence 
The position taken in paragraphs (a) and (b) is codified in 18 U.S.C. 
§3568 and has been similarly endorsed by the Brown Commission22 and 
the National Advisory Commission.23 This consensus obviates further 
explanation of why denial of credit for presentence custody is unfair. 
Current federal law, however, does not grant credit for custody under 
a different and unrelated charge on which a defendant is arrested and 
confined but not convicted, although such confinement occurs after the 
commission of the crime for which the sentence was imposed. Para-
graph (d) recommends that credit also be awarded in this situation as 
well, and the Brown Commission agrees.24 There are several reasons for 
17. SENTENCING COMPUTATION LAWS AND PRACTICE, supra note 1, at 15. 
18. II 
19. Id 
20. Id. at 15-16. But see Pruett v. Texas, 468 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1972), affd. en banc, 470 F.2d 
1182 (1973). 
21. See. e.g.. State v. Kennedy, 106 Ariz. 190, 472 P.2d 59 (1970); Jenkins v. Warden, 4 
Md. App. 629, 244 A.2d 468 (1968); Miles v. State, 214 So. 2d 101 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 
1968). 
22. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT §3205 
(1971). 
23. NAC, CORRECTIONS 5.S; see also NCCUSL, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT 
§3-502. 
24. FINAL REPORT, supra note 22, §3205(3); see also NCCUSL, MODEL SENTENCING AND 
CORRECTIONS ACT §3-502(C). Both the Brown Commission and the Model Sentencing and 
Corrections Act agree, however, that the offender should "not receive credit for the same 
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this recommendation. In some instances, the unrelated charge that went 
unprosecuted may have served as a kind of holding category, while the 
crime for which sentence was actually imposed may have been "the 
undisclosed basis for the first arrest."25 Even if this is not the case, 
failure to credit the time served under the offense for which there was 
no conviction gives rise to an inequitable forfeiture by the offender. 
This also violates the least drastic means principle, since such time 
equally well serves any legitimate correctional purpose. Potentially, the 
offender is exposed to a label game under which confinement can in 
effect be enhanced depending on the characterization placed on some 
portion of the presentence custody. 
One limit on this recommendation should be made clear: time served 
prior to the commission of the instant offense should not be credited, 
even if wrongfully served, since this might permit an offender to "bank" 
time against a future offense. 
As a practical matter, the recommendation in paragraph (d) will sel-
dom interfere with the flexibility accorded sentencing authorities, but 
will instead provide assurance that they have given adequate attention 
to a relevant factor. The only instance where a mandatory credit for 
such "dead time" will legally limit the authority of the sentencing court 
will be when such time plus the sentence the court wishes to impose 
exceeds the statutory authorized maximum, and it is exactly in such 
instances where a forfeiture of the prior time spent incarcerated seems 
most inequitable.26 In other situations, the court will still have the 
time more than once/' NCCUSL, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT, comment to 
§3-502. These standards concur, and this is the intent underlying the final clause in 
paragraph (d), referring to time "which has not been credited against another sentence." 
However, it should be noted that where multiple sentences are made to run concurrently, 
it is certainly not the intent of this standard to award the credit against one of two 
concurrent sentences and require its denial against the other. Given the tendency for the 
same criminal transaction to violate overlapping statutes (e.g., one proscribing mail fraud 
and the other wire fraud), such an absurd interpretation could frequently render the basic 
principle of this standard meaningless. But in other situations (such as where the second 
prosecution follows the expiration of the first sentence and the criminal conduct leading 
to the current sentence occurred prior to the arrest of the first charge), the legitimate 
interests of the defendant are amply protected by a single crediting. For a case illustrating 
the dangers of a doctrinaire approach to this single crediting rule, see Bruss v. Harris, 479 
F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1973) (credit for pretrial state confinement under a federal detainer 
denied where such time was credited against a state sentence concurrent with the federal 
sentence). 
25. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 22, comment to §3205. 
26. Cf. Tinin v. United States, 361 F.2d 829 (10th Cir. 1966); Short v. United States, 344 
F.2d 550, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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authority to exceed the recommended guideline range, although its 
explanation for such a departure will have to cite plausible factors. 
One other aspect of paragraph (a) deserves special emphasis. Credit 
should be awarded in instances where special treatment is imposed, or 
special diagnosis required, as a result of the conduct underlying the 
criminal charge. The "pending sentence" language would clearly in-
clude, for example, any time an offender spends in a diagnostic facility 
for the purpose of having a report compiled under a provision like that 
suggested in standard 18-5.6. A narrower statutory credit might unfor-
tunately cause the diagnostic facility to be used as a means of extending 
short sentences. It is also intended that credit be required if a defendant 
is later convicted of an offense on the basis of conduct for which the 
defendant has already been committed. Many of the sex offender stat-
utes described in the commentary to standard 18-2.5 would permit the 
criminal prosecution to proceed and a normal sentence to be imposed 
after the defendant has been released from a "civil" commitment for the 
same conduct. While these standards by no means approve of such 
provisions, if they are to be used at all, further criminal proceedings 
should at least count the time the offender has been civilly restrained 
for the same underlying conduct. The Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation 
Act of 1966 recognizes this principle by giving credit for any period of 
civil commitment for addiction against any criminal confinement based 
on the same conduct if criminal proceedings follow the civil commit-
ment.27 
Detention Under a Prior Invalid Sentence 
Paragraph (b) addresses the resentencing situation where a prior con-
viction or sentence has been held invalid. Historically, some cases once 
took the position that such confinement could be ignored since there 
was no legal sentence of which the law had to take note.28 The reducHo 
ad absurdum consequences of this line of reasoning were effectively ridi-
culed in a classic statement in King v. United States: 
The Government's brief suggests, in the vein of The Mikado, that 
because the first sentence was void appellant "has served no sentence but 
has merely spent time in the penitentiary"; that since he should not have 
been imprisoned as he was, he was not imprisoned at all. . . . As other 
27. See 28 U.S.C §2903(d) (1976). 
28. See Minto v. State, 9 Ala. App. 95, 64 So. 369 (1913). 
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§ 3 5 8 5 , Calculation of a term of imprisonment 
(a) Commencement of sentence.—A sentence to a term of imprisonment 
commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting 
transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, 
the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served. 
(b) Credit for prior custody.—A defendant shall be given credit toward 
the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official 
detention prior to the date the sentence commences— 
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or 
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was 
arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was 
imposed; 
that has not been credited against another sentence. 
(Added Pub.L. 98-473, Title II, § 212(a)(2), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2001.) 
Historical Note 
Effective Date. See section 235(a)(1) of Legislative History. For legislative history 
Pub.L. 98-473, set out as a note under sec- and purpose of Pub.L. 98-473, see 1984 U.S. 
tion 3551 of this title. Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 3182. 
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